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Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Under the AEDPA: The National Council Court
Erred in Requiring Pre-Designation Process
I. INTRODUCTION
September 11 will forever evoke terrible memories of the death
and destruction caused by coordinated terrorist attacks against the
United States.1 Following the attacks, President Bush announced
that “[t]here has been an act of war declared upon America by
terrorists,”2 and we will respond by “direct[ing] every resource at
our command, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence,
every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and
every necessary weapon of war, to the disruption and to the defeat of
the global terror network.”3 An important weapon in this “war”
against terrorism is the ability of the Secretary of State, under the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA” or
“Act”), to block all financial transactions involving the assets of
foreign terrorist organizations in the United States, to prevent
people from providing material support to foreign terrorist
organizations, and to prohibit representatives of foreign terrorist
organizations from entering the United States.4
Designation of an entity under the AEDPA as a foreign terrorist
organization represents one of those “‘extraordinary situations’ that

1. These attacks have been linked to Osama bin Laden, who is the leader of a terrorist
organization known as al-Qa’ida. See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001).
2. Remarks in a Meeting with the National Security Team and an Exchange with
Reporters at Camp David, Maryland, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1319, 1320 (Sept. 15,
2001).
3. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347, 1349 (Sept. 20,
2001).
4. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189 (West 2001), amended by Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing.”5 If an
organization received prior notice that it was being considered as a
foreign terrorist organization, it would have an opportunity to
immediately transfer all of its financial assets outside the jurisdiction
of the United States, frustrating the intent of Congress and the
foreign policy goals of the President.6 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recently rejected this reasoning
in National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of State
(“National Council”) and held that the Secretary of State
(“Secretary”) must afford putative terrorist organizations with due
process prior to their designation under the AEDPA.7 The court also
held that the Secretary must provide these organizations with notice
of the basis of a designation and the opportunity to introduce
rebuttal evidence into the record. A careful review of the AEDPA,
current due process jurisprudence, and the facts of National Council
will indicate that the court was incorrect in requiring pre-designation
process.
Part II of this Note discusses the designation provisions of the
AEDPA. Part III reviews current procedural due process
jurisprudence. Part IV discusses the case law with respect to due
process challenges of the designation provisions of the AEDPA. Part
V is divided into two primary sections, one discussing the timing of
due process and the other discussing the content of due process in
light of the AEDPA and the facts of National Council. This Note
concludes in Part VI that the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia should reevaluate its holding in National
Council and find that providing post-designation process to putative
terrorist organizations with financial assets in the United States does
not violate the Due Process Clause.

5. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
6. Brief for Respondents at 48, Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State,
251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439).
7. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir.
2001). See also Jason Binimow & Amy Bunk, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Operation of “Foreign Terrorist Organization” Provision of Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189, 2001 A.L.R. FED. 9 (2001); Robyn Whipple Diaz,
Foreign Organizations Designated as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” Are Entitled to Due
Process Protection when such a Designation Is Made by the Secretary of State, 16 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 268 (2001); D.C. Circuit Considers Due Process Issues in Context of “Foreign Terrorist
Organization” Designations, 78 NO. 31 INTER. REL. 1304 (2001).
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II. DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
UNDER THE AEDPA
A. The Procedural Requirements of Designation
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
authorizes the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary
of the Treasury and Attorney General,8 “to designate an organization
as a foreign terrorist organization”9 upon finding that the
organization meets certain statutorily defined criteria.10 The
Secretary is required to compile an administrative record, which may
include classified information,11 and base his findings upon the
information gathered therein.12 Any classified information contained
in the record need not be disclosed to a designated organization, but
the “information may be disclosed to a court ex parte and in camera
for purposes of judicial review.”13 A designation made under the
statute is effective for a period of two years, and the Secretary may
redesignate the organization for another two-year period upon
finding that the relevant circumstances on which the previous
designation was based still exist.14
Seven days prior to making a designation, the Secretary must
notify various congressional leaders of his intent to designate an
organization and of the factual basis for the designation.15 Seven days
after such notification, the Secretary must publish the designation in
the Federal Register.16 Once the Secretary notifies Congress of the
impending designation, all financial transactions involving the assets
of the organization in the United States may be blocked.17 All

8. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(c)(4).
9. Id. § 1189(a)(1).
10. See id. The statutorily defined criteria will be discussed in detail in the following
section. In brief, the Secretary must find that the organization is foreign, that it engages in
terrorism, and that its activities threaten the national security of the United States.
11. See id. § 1189(a)(3)(B).
12. See id. § 1189(a)(3); Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 196 (citing 5 U.S.C.A. § 557(c)
(West 2001)).
13. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(3)(B); Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 197.
14. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(4)(A)–(B).
15. See id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i).
16. See id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(ii).
17. The statute authorizes the blockage of “any assets” within the possession or control
of a United States financial institution. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(C). Other statutory
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persons within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
who “knowingly provide[] material support” to the organization, or
attempt or conspire to do so, are subject to fines and
imprisonment.18 All financial institutions that do not maintain
control over and report to the Secretary the existence of any foreign
terrorist organization funds are also subject to severe fines.19 In
addition, alien representatives and members of the designated
foreign terrorist organization are ineligible for visas or admission into
the United States.20
B. The Definition of a Foreign Terrorist Organization
As mentioned above, the AEDPA authorizes the Secretary to
designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organization;
however, before making a designation, the Secretary must find that
an organization meets three statutorily defined criteria: (1) the
organization must be a “foreign” organization;21 (2) the
organization must “engage[] in terrorist activity”;22 and (3) the
organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must “threaten[] the
security of United States nationals or the national security of the
United States.”23 Each of these criteria will be discussed in detail
below.
1. The organization must be a “foreign” organization
The Secretary must first make a finding, based on substantial
evidence in the record,24 that the organization is a “foreign”
organization.25 Unfortunately, the statute does not define the term
language contemplates that these financial assets will probably consist of “funds.” See 18
U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(2) (West 2001).
18. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1), amended by Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
19. See id. § 2339B(b).
20. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)–(V) (West 2001), amended by Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
21. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(A).
22. Id. § 1189(a)(1)(B).
23. Id. § 1189(a)(1)(C).
24. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23–24 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
25. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(A).
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“foreign organization.” Indeed, nowhere in the United States Code
is the term “foreign organization” defined.26 While such an inquiry
may seem trivial, it is a legitimate ground on which an organization
designated under the AEDPA may challenge the designation.
Despite the lack of statutory guidance, there is some evidence
that the Secretary will narrowly interpret the term “foreign
organization” when making designations under the AEDPA. On
October 8, 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright redesignated
the Mujahedin-e Khalq (“PMOI”) as a foreign terrorist
organization.27 The Secretary also redesignated a number of other
organizations as aliases of PMOI and included them within the scope
of PMOI’s designation.28 One organization so designated for the
first time was the National Council of Resistance of Iran (“NCRI”).
NCRI, the U.S. representative office of NCRI (“NCRIUS”), and
PMOI challenged the designation in National Council.29 In its
petition for review, NCRIUS argued that since it was a domestic
non-profit corporation organized under the laws of the District of
Columbia, it was not a “foreign organization” and thus could not be
designated as such under the AEDPA. 30 In a terse response, the
government agreed that NCRIUS was not included in the
designation.31 This small exchange is perhaps a hint that the

26. The term is defined in a few unrelated sections of the Code of Federal Regulations.
For example, in 12 C.F.R. § 347.102(k) (2001), the term “foreign organization” is defined as
“an organization that is organized under the laws of a foreign country.”
27. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112 (Oct. 8,
1999).
28. In the designation, the Secretary named “Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization,” and
then listed its aliases:
also known as MEK, also known as MKO, also known as Mujahedin-e Khalq, also
known as People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran, also known as PMOI, also
known as Organization of the People’s Holy Warriors of Iran, also known as
Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran, also known as National Council of
Resistance, also known as NCR, also known as the National Liberation Army of
Iran, also known as NLA.
Id.
29. 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This case will be examined below.
30. See Brief for Petitioners National Council of Resistance of Iran and National Council
of Resistance of Iran, U.S. Representative Office at 16, Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d 192 (Nos. 991438, 99-1439). The court in National Council also noted that “[a] third petitioner, National
Council of Resistance of Iran-United States (“NCRI-US”) joined the brief of NCRI, fearful
that because the Secretary did not distinguish between the NCRI and NCRI-US it may have
been included in the designation as well.” Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 197 n.1.
31. Brief for Respondents at 28, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). The court in
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government will not include an organization, corporation, or
association organized under the laws of the United States within its
definition of a “foreign organization” for purposes of the AEDPA,
even if such an organization, corporation, or association is
substantially controlled, owned, dominated, or sponsored by a
foreign organization or government. In light of the recent terrorist
attacks against the United States, the government may become more
willing to include a domestic organization within a designation if the
organization is sponsored or controlled by a foreign terrorist
organization; however, recent designations indicate a continued
policy of interpreting “foreign organization” narrowly.32
It is important to note here that a “foreign” entity must also be
deemed an “organization.”33 It appears, however, that Congress did
not mean for the definition of “organization” to restrict the
Secretary’s ability to designate an entity under the AEDPA. Indeed,
Congress defined a “terrorist organization” as an organization so
designated under the AEDPA; an organization that engages in
terrorist activities otherwise designated by the Secretary as a terrorist
organization; or “a group of two or more individuals, whether
organized or not, which engages in [terrorist] activities.”34 Under
this definition, it is difficult to imagine a situation where an entity or
group would not fit within the definition of “organization” for
purposes of the AEDPA.
2. The foreign organization must engage in “terrorism” or “terrorist
activity”
Once the Secretary finds that an organization is “foreign,” she
must find, based on substantial support in the record35 that the
National Council noted that “[i]n its brief to this court, the United States agrees that NCRIUS was not so designated, and we therefore do not separately consider any claims on behalf of
that entity.” See Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 197 n.1.
32. In recent designations, the Secretary renewed PMOI’s designation and NCRI’s
designation as an alias of PMOI, but the Secretary did not specifically include NCRIUS in its
designation. See Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organization, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,088 (Oct.
5, 2001).
33. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(A) (West 2001).
34. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi), amended by Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
35. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23–24 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Essentially, the Secretary must have enough information in the record to support a

680

ELL-FIN

675]

9/30/2002 9:20 AM

Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

foreign organization “engages in terrorist36 activity.”37 The statutory
definition of terrorist activity is broad and includes unlawful activity
which involves the “highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance,”
hostage taking, an attack or assassination, or the use of weapons or
dangerous devices with the requisite intent,38 including biological,
chemical, and nuclear weapons.39 Furthermore, the definition of
terrorist activity includes any threat, attempt, or conspiracy to engage
in any of the activities listed above.40
An organization engages in terrorist activity when it commits or
incites another to commit a terrorist activity, when it prepares or
plans a terrorist activity, when it “gather[s] information on potential
targets for terrorist activity,” when it solicits funds for a terrorist
activity or another terrorist organization, or when it solicits an
individual to engage in terrorist activity or to become a member of a
terrorist organization.41 In addition, an organization engages in
terrorist activity when it provides material support “for the
commission of a terrorist activity, or to a terrorist organization.”42

reasonable belief that the foreign organization is engaged in terrorist activities. Id. at 25;
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000).
36. The term terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” 22
U.S.C.A. § 2656f(d)(2) (West 2001).
37. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(B).
38. The statute defines the requisite intent as the “intent to endanger, directly or
indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damages to property.”
Id. § 1182(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b).
39. Id. § 1182(3)(B)(iii)(I)–(V).
40. Id. § 1182(3)(B)(iii)(VI).
41. Id. § 1182(3)(B)(iv)(I)–(V).
42. Id. § 1182(3)(B)(iv)(VI). The statute defines “material support or resources” as
“currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or
assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment,
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical
assets, except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b) (West 2001),
amended by Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001). The Ninth Circuit in Humanitarian Law Project affirmed the district court’s
finding that “two of the components included within the definition of material support,
‘training’ and ‘personnel,’ were impermissibly vague,” and “enjoined the prosecution of . . .
[people] for activities covered by these terms.” Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d
1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000).
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3. The terrorist activities of a foreign organization must threaten
national security
The third and final finding required under the AEDPA before
designation is that “the terrorist activity or terrorism of the
organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the
national security of the United States.”43 The statute defines
“national security” as “the national defense, foreign relations, or
economic interests of the United States.”44 The finding can be based
not only on domestic national security threats but also on threats to
U.S. nationals or U.S. interests abroad.45
C. Judicial Review of Designations
An organization may challenge a designation made under the
AEDPA in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia within thirty days after publication of the designation in
the Federal Register.46 The Act provides for judicial review “based
solely upon the administrative record.”47 As noted previously, the
Secretary may also submit to the court classified information for ex
parte and in camera review.48 There is no opportunity for a
designated foreign terrorist organization to introduce rebuttal
evidence into the record.49 Judicial examination of a designation is
limited to the first two findings required by the Act, i.e., that the
“organizations are ‘foreign’ and that they ‘engage[] in terrorist

43. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(C) (West 2001).
44. Id. § 1189(c)(2).
45. The designation of PMOI is a good example of an organization that arguably did
not threaten domestic interests but did threaten U.S. interests abroad. The Secretary
designated PMOI as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997. See Designation of Foreign
Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997). At that time, PMOI had “no
presence in the United States,” People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Department of State, 182
F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999), but it did threaten U.S. interests in Iran. PMOI “collaborated
with Ayatollah Khomeini to overthrow the former Shah of Iran. As part of that struggle, they
assassinated at least six American citizens, supported the takeover of the U.S. embassy, and
opposed the release of American hostages.” Id. at 20 (internal quotations omitted). PMOI also
“exploded time bombs at more than a dozen sites throughout Tehran, including the IranAmerican Society, . . . and the offices of Pepsi Cola and General Motors.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
46. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(b)(1).
47. Id. § 1189(b)(2).
48. Id.
49. See People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 25.
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activity.’”50 The Secretary’s determination that the organization
threatens national security is not subject to judicial review because it
implicates foreign policy and national security issues.51 Upon review,
the court may set aside a designation it finds to be: (1) “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law”; (2) “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity”; (3) “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitation, or short of statutory right”; (4) “lacking substantial
support in the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified
information submitted to the court . . . ”; or (5) “not in accord with
the procedures required by law.”52
III. THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Before examining relevant case law with regard to the
designation provisions of the AEDPA, this section will review current
due process jurisprudence generally. This foundation will be helpful
in understanding the reasoning underlying the People’s Mojahedin
and National Council decisions discussed in Part IV below. This
foundation will also be useful in Part V of this Note, where current
due process jurisprudence will be applied to the designation
provisions of the AEDPA generally, and the facts of the National
Council decision specifically, in order to analyze the strengths and
weaknesses of that decision.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that
“[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”53 Courts have interpreted this clause to

50. Id. at 24. The court had previously held that 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(C) was not
subject to judicial review. Id. at 23.
51. Id. at 22.
52. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(b)(3).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The amendment provides in full that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id. The source of this concept is often traced to the original Charter of 1215 which provided
that “[n]o free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any
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have a procedural and a substantive component.54 Substantive due
process concerns whether government action depriving an individual
of life, liberty, or property bears “a rational relation to a
constitutionally permissible objective.”55 On the other hand,
procedural due process, which is the focus of this Note, “provides
that certain substantive rights—life, liberty, and property—cannot be
deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.”56
While the procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause
do not have “a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,”57 the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”58 A court
must examine three critical issues in any procedural due process
claim asserted by a foreign person or entity: (1) whether the person
or entity has a constitutional presence in the United States; (2)
whether government action deprived the person or entity of a
constitutionally protected interest; and (3) whether the procedural
protections provided by the government, if any, were constitutionally
sufficient.59
A. The Foreign Person or Entity Must Have a
Constitutional Presence in the United States
The first issue a court must address when examining a due
process claim asserted by a foreign person or entity is whether the
way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or
by the law of the land.” CHARLES A. MILLER, THE FOREST OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW: THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 3, 4 (1977) (emphasis added). In the 1354 reissue
of the Charter, the Magna Carta appeared officially in English for the first time, and in place of
the words “by the law of the land,” are the words “by due process of the law.” Id. at 5.
54. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.1
(6th ed. 2000).
55. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 733 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)).
56. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). See also RONALD
D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 14.6 (2d ed. 1992), for a discussion of the differences between procedural due
process and substantive due process.
57. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961)).
58. Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (internal
quotations omitted)).
59. See generally ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 56, at § 17.1.
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person or entity has a constitutional presence in the United States.60
A foreign person or entity “without property or presence in this
country has no constitutional rights, under the due process clause or
otherwise.”61 The Supreme Court has held that “aliens receive
constitutional protections when they have come within the territory
of the United States and developed substantial connections with this
country.”62 This standard has been interpreted to apply to foreign
organizations as well.63 What exactly constitutes “substantial
connections” in any given factual context is not clear, but an
organization’s interest in a financial account held in the United
States is generally sufficient to establish such connections.64 In any
event, the constitutional presence of a foreign person or organization
is an important factor in any due process analysis because it may be
that the organization is not entitled to constitutional protection at
all, much less entitled to specific protection under the Due Process
Clause.
B. There Must Be a Deprivation of Life, Liberty, or Property
The second issue a court must address when examining a due
process claim is whether some type of government action has
deprived a person or entity of a life, liberty, or property interest
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.65 It is well
recognized that “the range of interests protected by procedural due
process is not infinite”66 but is limited to a literal and restrictive
definition of life, liberty, and property.67 If a life, liberty, or property
interest is not implicated, the government is free to deprive an

60. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
61. See, e.g., id. at 22.
62. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
63. See, e.g., Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C.
Cir 2001); People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d 17.
64. See, e.g., Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d 192 (2001). In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 571–72 (1972), the Supreme Court noted that it was clear “that the property interests
protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate,
chattels, or money.” If a property interest in “real estate, chattels, or money” is protected by
due process, it seems logical that its ownership by a foreign organization would establish that
organization’s constitutional presence.
65. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–72.
66. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570.
67. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 56, § 17.2.
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individual of an interest without adhering to the procedural
requirements of the Due Process Clause.68 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has “repeatedly rejected the notion that any grievous loss
visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the
procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.”69
The first protected interest mentioned in the Due Process Clause
is “life.” The Supreme Court has never defined the term “life,” but
some of the Court’s decisions regarding the prohibition of voluntary
abortions imply that for purposes of due process, life begins
postnatally.70 Also implicit in the Court’s death penalty cases is the
notion that life is the period of time, from birth until death, in which
a person exists as an animate being.71 Under these definitions, it
appears that the designation provisions of the AEDPA, limited as
they are to foreign “organizations,” do not implicate an individual’s
interest in “life.”
The second interest protected by the Due Process Clause is
“liberty.” This interest is generally defined as the right “to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”72 The term “liberty”
undoubtedly encompasses “freedom from bodily restraint,”73 but it
also includes freedom from government deprivation of certain
fundamental rights.74 These fundamental rights are those that have
“specific textual recognition [in the Constitution] of their existence
and importance,”75 those that are “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed,”76 and those that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
68. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977). Of course, the government’s
action may still implicate other constitutional provisions.
69. Id. (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)).
70. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK , supra note 56, § 17.3. The Court in Roe v. Wade held
that “the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”
410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). In nearly all the instances where the word “person” is used in the
Constitution, “it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it
has any possible prenatal application.” Id. at 157.
71. See generally Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
72. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
73. Id.
74. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
75. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 790
(1986) (White, J., dissenting).
76. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937).
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history and tradition.”77 The Supreme Court has considered most of
the guarantees provided by the Bill of Rights as “fundamental,” and
thus protected under the Due Process Clause.78 Although not in the
context of a due process claim, the consequences of designation have
been challenged as violating certain constitutional interests that may
qualify as liberty interests. However, the issue of whether the
designation provisions under the AEDPA deprive a person or
organization of a constitutionally protected liberty interest has yet to
be directly addressed.
The third and final interest protected by the Due Process Clause
is “property.” The Due Process Clause protects all traditional forms
of personal and real property, including money,79 and the Supreme
Court has extended this protection to “entitlements.”80 The Court
noted that “[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have
more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”81 Entitlements are not defined
by the Constitution; “they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits.”82 Thus, a governmentally conferred benefit becomes
a constitutionally protected property interest when the “law which
governs the dispensation of the benefit . . . define[s] the interest in

77. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
78. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 56, § 17.4, and accompanying citations.
Fundamental rights are by no means limited to those identified in the Bill of Rights. In Board
of Regents v. Roth, the Court noted that the term “liberty” denotes the following:
[T]he right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
79. In Roth, 408 U.S. at 571–72, the Supreme Court noted that it was clear “that the
property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of
real estate, chattels, or money.”
80. Id. at 577.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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such a way that the individual should continue to receive it under the
terms of the law.”83
It is fairly well established that a person’s property interest in
money or a bank account in the United States is sufficient to
establish the possessor’s constitutional presence.84 The deprivation of
this interest will entitle the possessor to the protection of the Due
Process Clause. This is probably the most obvious constitutionally
protected interest implicated by the designation of an entity as a
foreign terrorist organization under the AEDPA. Even a cursory
glance at the designation provisions of the AEDPA indicates that one
of the primary goals of the Act is to block all financial transactions
involving the funds of a putative foreign terrorist organization.85
Indeed, the deprivation of this interest was the basis upon which the
National Council court held that the putative foreign terrorist
organizations in that case were entitled to due process.
C. The Procedure, If Any, Must Be Constitutionally Sufficient
The second critical issue a court must examine when confronted
with a due process claim is whether the procedural protection
provided by the government, if any, is constitutionally sufficient.
Due process “is a flexible concept that varies with the particular
situation.”86 Three factors identify “the specific dictates of due
process.”87 First, a court must consider “the private interest that will
be affected by the official action.”88 Second, a court must inquire
into “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards.”89 The third and final factor
embodies a consideration of “the Government’s interest, including

83. ROTUNDA & NOWAK , supra note 56, § 17.5.
84. See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 571–72; Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437, 444–45, 448 (1952). In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., the Court
held that “a bank account surely [is] a form of property,” and its impoundment without notice
or hearing violates due process. 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975).
85. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(C) (West 2001); 18 U.S.C.A § 2339B(a)(2)(A) (West
2001).
86. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990).
87. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”90
Applying this so-called Mathews balancing test, the Court usually
finds that due process demands “that a deprivation of life, liberty, or
property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.’”91 The purpose of this general
rule “is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual,” but to
ensure that the individual is protected from “arbitrary
encroachment[s]” of the government, and “to minimize
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations.”92 There are exceptions
to this general rule in “extraordinary situations where some valid
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing
until after the event,”93 or when it is impossible for the government
to provide pre-deprivation process for the particular deprivation at
issue.94
The Mathews balancing test should be used in at least two
distinct areas of procedural due process analysis.95 First, the test
should be used when determining whether an individual is entitled
to a hearing prior to a government deprivation of a protected
interest.96 This is sometimes called the “when” of due process.97
Second, regardless of when notice and a hearing are required, the
test should be used “to determine the precise procedures to be
employed at the hearing.”98 This is sometimes called the “what” of

90. Id.
91. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (emphasis added)
(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)). See, e.g.,
id. at 542 (concluding that the “root requirement of the Due Process Clause [is] that an
individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant
property interest”).
92. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972).
93. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
94. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129 (1990). In circumstances where it would
be impossible for a state to provide notice and a hearing prior to the deprivation, the Court has
held that a state common law tort remedy is sufficient procedure under the Due Process
Clause. Id.
95. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 56, § 17.8.
96. See id.; see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. 113; Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
97. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 205–06 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
98. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 56, § 17.8; see, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976).

689

ELL-FIN

9/30/2002 9:20 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2002

due process.99 For purposes of analytical clarity, this Note will
maintain the distinction between the “when” of due process and the
“what” of due process in the sections below.
IV. THE PEOPLE’S MOJAHEDIN AND
NATIONAL COUNCIL DECISIONS
There are two significant cases involving due process challenges
of designation made under the AEDPA: People’s Mojahedin and
National Council.100 In People’s Mojahedin, the D.C. Circuit held
that a foreign organization with no property or presence in the
United States is not entitled to any due process protection under the
Act.101 The court did not address the question of whether
constitutional protection should be afforded to an organization with
property or presence in the United States. Two years later in
National Council, in response to another due process claim, the
D.C. Circuit held that a foreign organization with property in the
United States is entitled to notice and to some type of hearing prior
to designation under the AEDPA.102 The facts and analyses of both
cases are briefly examined in the following subsections.
A. The People’s Mojahedin Decision
The D.C. Circuit held in People’s Mojahedin that the
Constitution does not protect a foreign organization without
property or presence in the United States.103 The plaintiffs in that
case were the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”) and the
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (“PMOI”). Both
organizations were designated as “foreign terrorist organizations” by

99. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 205–06.
100. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17 (1999); Nat’l
Council, 251 F.3d 192 (2001); see also 32 County Sovereignty Committee v. Dep’t of State,
292 F.3d 797 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (following the analysis in People’s Mojahdin). The statute has
been challenged on other grounds. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130,
1133 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the AEDPA did not violate the First Amendment, but
enjoining the prosecution of plaintiffs for activities covered by the impermissibly vague words
“training” and “material”).
101. See People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 22.
102. See Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 208–09.
103. See People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 22.
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the Secretary of State on October 8, 1997,104 and both organizations
subsequently sought judicial review of the designations under 8
U.S.C.A. § 1189(b)(1).105 The organizations argued that their due
process rights were violated because “the Secretary’s designation had
the effect of making it a crime to donate money to them.”106 The
D.C. Circuit quickly disposed of this argument, holding that because
the LTTE and the PMOI had no property or presence in the United
States, they had “no constitutional rights, under the due process
clause or otherwise.”107
Despite this holding, the LTTE and the PMOI were still entitled
to exercise the statutory rights conferred upon them by the AEDPA.
These rights consisted of contesting “their designations on the
grounds set forth in § 1189(b)(3),” which entailed seeking the
court’s “judgment about whether the Secretary followed statutory
procedures, or whether she made the requisite findings, or whether
the record she assembled substantially supports her findings.”108
After reviewing the record under these standards, the court
concluded that none of the organizations’ statutory rights were
violated and refused to set aside the designations.109
In reaching its decision, the court noted that it could set aside a
designation under the AEDPA if the first two requisite findings, i.e.,
that an organization is foreign and that it engages in terrorist
activities, did not have substantial support in the administrative
record.110 However, the court held that the third and final required
finding—that the terrorist activity of the organization threaten
national security—is non-justiciable because it is a decision “of a kind
for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor
responsibility and [has] long been held to belong in the domain of
political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.”111
104. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8,
1997).
105. See People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 18–19.
106. Id. at 22.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 25.
110. See id. at 22, 24.
111. Id. at 23 (quoting Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steam Ship Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 111 (1948)). The position of the D.C. Circuit as to the third factor is consistent
with a long line of Supreme Court decisions finding executive and legislative decisions
involving national security and foreign relations issues non-justiciable. See, e.g., Chicago & S.
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The court also recognized that its role in reviewing the quality or
reliability of the information contained in the record was limited.
This is because the Act restricts its review to an administrative record
compiled solely by the Secretary of information “[n]ever subjected to
adversary testing.”112 The Act has no provision allowing the putative
terrorist organization an opportunity to introduce “counterevidence” into the record.113 The reliability of any information is
difficult to judge without counter-evidence, counter-arguments, or
counter-analyses with which to compare it. As a result, the court
found that its only function “is to decide if the Secretary, on the face
of things, had enough information before her to come to the
conclusion that the organizations were foreign and engaged in
terrorism.”114
B. The National Council Decision
The D.C. Circuit revisited the due process question again in
National Council, holding that when a foreign organization has a
property interest in the United States, due process requires the
Secretary to provide the organization with notice and some type of
hearing prior to designation under the Act.115 The petitioners in
National Council were the National Council of Resistance of Iran
(“NCRI”) and the PMOI. The PMOI was redesignated as a foreign
terrorist organization by the Secretary of State on October 8, 1999,
after the Secretary found that the PMOI continued to engage in
terrorist activities.116 This redesignation of the PMOI extended its
Air Lines, 333 U.S. at 111–12; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939); United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–21 (1936); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). The Court has recognized “the generally accepted view that
foreign policy [is] the province and responsibility of the Executive.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280, 293–94 (1981). Matters related to foreign affairs and national security “are so exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry
or interference,” Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952), and “are rarely proper
subjects for judicial intervention.” Haig, 453 U.S. at 292.
112. People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 25.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir
2001), reh’g denied (August 27, 2001).
116. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112 (Oct. 8,
1999). In the two-year period following its 1997 designation, the PMOI allegedly claimed
responsibility for the killing of two Iranian officials and three separate bombings of Iranian
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1997 designation for two more years. The D.C. Circuit rejected the
PMOI’s petition for review of the 1997 designation in the People’s
Mojahedin case discussed above. The Secretary also designated the
NCRI for the first time as a foreign terrorist organization on
October 8, 1999, finding that NCRI was an “alias or alter ego” of
the PMOI.117 The organizations argued, among other things,118
“that by designating them without notice or hearing as a foreign
terrorist organization . . . , the Secretary deprived them of liberty, or
property, without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.”119
In examining whether the organizations had a constitutional
presence in this country, the court determined that the “PMOI and
NCRI have entered the territory of the United States and established
substantial connections with this country.”120 While the court noted
that “neither the record nor the classified information establishes a
presence for the PMOI under its own name,” the same was not true
as to the NCRI.121 The NCRI had “an overt presence within the
National Press Building in Washington, D.C.” and claimed to have
an interest in a $200 bank account.122 These connections were
government facilities in Iran. See Brief for Respondents at 22, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438,
99-1439).
117. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 197.
118. The organizations made various constitutional and statutory arguments against the
Secretary’s ability to make such “alias” designations; however, the court rejected these
arguments because there was substantial support in the record indicating that the NCRI was an
“alias” of the PMOI. Thus, while the Secretary did not specifically make the three required
findings concerning the NCRI, the court reasoned that “[i]f the NCRI is the PMOI, and if the
PMOI is a foreign terrorist organization, then the NCRI is a foreign terrorist organization
also.” Id. at 200.
119. Id. The Secretary also argued that this line of reasoning was foreclosed by the
court’s prior opinion in People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d 17. The court rejected this argument,
reasoning that the mere fact that the PMOI did not establish its constitutional presence two
years previously did not foreclose the possibility that it could “now have a presence in this
country.” Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 201.
120. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 203. The court made a critical assumption here, the
validity of which is beyond the scope of this Note. The court assumed that the standard
required to be met before due process protection is extended to a foreign entity is the same
standard as applied to an alien individual. This standard extends constitutional protection to
aliens “when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed
substantial connections with this country.” Id. at 202 (quoting United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)).
121. Id. at 201.
122. Id.; see also Brief for Respondents at 39, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). It
is interesting to note that the court in People’s Mojahedin found that PMOI had “offices and
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sufficient to allow the NCRI to “lay claim to having come within the
territory of the United States and developed substantial connections
with this country.”123 The NCRI’s connections were also sufficient
to allow the PMOI to claim a constitutional presence in this country.
“The Secretary concluded in her designation,” the court observed,
“that the NCRI and the PMOI are one. The NCRI is present in the
United States. If A is B, and B is present, then A is present also.”124
The court then found that the designation process and its
consequences deprived the organizations of a constitutionally
protected interest entitling them to due process of law.125 The court
noted that “at least one of the [organizations] has an interest in a
bank account in the United States.”126 This $200 bank account was
in fact owned by the NCRI,127 but as the organizations “are one, if
one [owns it], they both do.”128 The Supreme Court has made clear,
the court continued, that “a foreign organization that acquires or
holds property in this country may invoke the protections of the
Constitution when that property is placed in jeopardy by
government intervention.”129 As a result of the Secretary’s
designation, all financial transactions involving the organizations’
bank account could be blocked.130 The court found that “for the
present purposes, the colorable allegation [of the existence of a bank
account] would seem enough to support their due process
claims.”131
The organizations also argued that the consequences of
designation under the AEDPA deprived their members of certain

members throughout . . . North America.” People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 21. Some of those
offices were located in the United States. See Brief of Petitioner People’s Mojahedin of Iran at
10, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). Thus, the only difference between a finding of no
constitutional presence in People’s Mojahedin and a finding of constitutional presence in
National Council was a $200 bank account possessed by its alias, the NCRI.
123. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 201.
124. Id. at 202
125. See id. at 203.
126. See id. at 204.
127. See Brief for Respondents at 39, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439); Brief for
Petitioners at 19, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439).
128. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 204.
129. Id. (citing Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491–92 (1931)).
130. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(C) (West 2001); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(2) (West
2001).
131. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 204.
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liberty interests. Members were deprived of their right to enter the
United States, to travel outside of the United States, and to exercise
their “First Amendment associational and expressive rights.”132 The
court did not decide whether these alleged deprivations were enough
to implicate due process “because the invasion of the Fifth
Amendment protected property right . . . [wa]s sufficient to entitle
[the organizations] to the due process of law.”133
132. Id. at 204–05. The organizations argued that designation under the AEDPA not
only curtailed their right to contract, see Brief for Petitioners National Council of Resistance of
Iran and National Council of Resistance of Iran, U.S. Representative Office at 21, Nat’l
Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439) (“stigmatizing governmental action curtailing the liberty to
contract, whether for a beer, banking services, or anything else that can be bought in the free
market, triggers procedural due process requirements”), but also curtailed their members’
rights to enter the United States, associate with the organizations, and provide material
support to the organizations. See id. at 21; Brief of Petitioner People’s Mojahedin of Iran at
15–16, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439). The underlying premise of these arguments
was that the interests identified above were so “fundamental” that they must be included
within the definition of a “liberty” interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The court
never reached the merits of these arguments because the organizations also argued that the
designation deprived them of a property interest, see Brief of Petitioner People’s Mojahedin of
Iran at 13, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439), and the court determined that it “need
not decide as an initial matter whether those consequences invade Fifth Amendment protected
rights of liberty, because the invasion of the Fifth Amendment protected property right in the
first consequence is sufficient to entitle [the organizations] to the due process of law.” Nat’l
Council, 251 F.3d at 205.
Although the court failed to reach the merits of these claims, the Ninth Circuit in
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno rejected similar claims brought against the AEDPA under
the First Amendment. See 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The plaintiffs in that case alleged
that the AEDPA violated the First Amendment by prohibiting the giving of material support
to designated organizations and by restricting their right to associate with designated
organizations. Id. at 1133–37. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims because the AEDPA
was sufficiently tailored to accomplish its legitimate end of “preventing the United States from
being used as a base for terrorist fundraising.” Id. at 1136. However, the court did determine
that “two of the components included within the definition of material support, ‘training’ and
‘personnel,’ were impermissibly vague,” and “enjoined the prosecution of any of the plaintiffs’
members for activities covered by these terms.” Id. at 1137. Congress amended the definition
of material support subsequent to this decision; however, it did not eliminate the terms
“training” or “personnel,” but instead added “expert advice or assistance” to the definition.
See 8 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b), amended by Uniting and Strengthening America by providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Interpret and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 377.
133. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 205. In response to the argument that the designation
deprives organization members of the right to enter the United States, the court noted that the
Secretary argued “with some convincing force that aliens have no right of entry and that the
organization has no standing to judicially assert rights which its members could not bring to
court.” Id. at 204. In response to the First Amendment arguments, the government argued that
“the limitation does not affect the ability of anyone to engage in advocacy of the goals of the
organizations, but only from providing material support which might likely be employed in the
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In addressing whether the Due Process Clause was violated in
this case, the court examined “when” the constitutionally required
process was due before examining “what” constitutionally required
process was due.134 In other words, the court first determined
whether the fundamental requirements of due process should be
observed prior to or subsequent to a designation under the AEDPA.
The Secretary argued that “no governmental interest is more
compelling than the security of the nation.”135 This compelling
interest would be frustrated “[i]f an organization were warned that it
was being considered for designation as an alias of a foreign terrorist
organization, [because] it would have an opportunity to remove or
hide its assets . . . .”136
The court apparently rejected the government’s argument,
concluding that “the government has offered nothing that
apparently weighs in favor of post-deprivational as opposed to predeprivational compliance with due process requirements of the
Constitution.”137 The court also noted that the Secretary has not
“shown how affording the organization whatever due process they
are due before their designation as foreign terrorist organizations
and the resulting deprivation of right would interfere with the
Secretary’s duty to carry out foreign policy.”138 As such, the court
held that “the Secretary must afford the limited due process available
to the putative foreign terrorist organization prior to the deprivation
worked by designating that entity as such with its attendant
consequences.”139 This holding, however, did “not foreclose the
possibility of the Secretary, in an appropriate case, demonstrating the
necessity of withholding all notice and all opportunity to present
evidence until the designation is already made.”140

pursuit of unlawful terrorist purposes as of First Amendment protected advocacy.” Id. at 205.
134. Id. at 205–06.
135. Id. at 207 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)).
136. See Brief for Respondents at 48, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439).
137. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 207.
138. Id. at 207–08.
139. Id. at 208 (emphasis added). While the court recognized an exception to the predeprivation notice and hearing requirement if the Secretary could “make a showing of
particularized need,” that showing is apparently not made when the Secretary compiles an
administrative record supporting the conclusion that a foreign organization is using the United
States as a base to fund terrorist activities, since notice to that organization will allow it to
transfer any and all funds presently collected in the United States to another jurisdiction.
140. Id.
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After determining the “when” of due process, the court then
examined the “what” of due process. In other words, the court
determined what procedural protections are constitutionally required
in designating an organization under the AEDPA. The court
recognized that the fundamental requirements of due process
include notice of the action sought and a right to an effective
hearing. “This,” the court held, “is what the Constitution requires of
the Secretary in designating organizations as foreign terrorist
organizations under the statute.”141 In order to satisfy the notice
requirement, the court directed the Secretary to “provide notice of
those unclassified items upon which he proposes to rely to the entity
to be designated” once he “has reach[ed] a tentative determination
that the designation is impending.”142 In order to meet the hearing
requirement, the court directed the Secretary to “afford to the
entities considered for imminent designation the opportunity to
present, at least in written form, such evidence as those entities may
be able to produce to rebut the administrative record or otherwise
negate the proposition that they are foreign terrorist
organizations.”143
The court found that “even in those instances when postdeprivation due process is sufficient, our review under § 1189(b) is
not sufficient to supply the otherwise absent due process
protection.”144 In other words, notice by publication in the Federal
Register and the ability of putative terrorist organizations to petition
the D.C. Circuit for review of designations alone will not satisfy due
process in those cases where delayed notice is otherwise acceptable.
This is because the court’s review is limited to an administrative
record compiled solely by the Secretary “without notice or
opportunity for any meaningful hearing.”145
In conclusion, the court instructed the Secretary to afford due
process rights to other organizations in the future. “While not within
our current order,” the court stated, “we expect that the Secretary
will afford due process rights to these and other similarly situated

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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entities in the course of future designations.”146 In fashioning a
remedy, the court did not set aside the designations, but remanded
the case to the Secretary “with instructions that the [organizations]
be afforded the opportunity to file responses to the nonclassified
evidence against them, to file evidence in support of their allegations
that they are not terrorist organizations, and that they be afforded an
opportunity to be meaningfully heard by the Secretary upon the
relevant findings.”147
V. EXAMINING THE NATIONAL COUNCIL DECISION
THROUGH THE LENS OF DUE PROCESS
The National Council decision will be examined in detail below
using the Mathews balancing test. This section will first examine the
court’s analysis as to the “when” of due process, and will argue that
the court was incorrect in requiring notice and a hearing prior to
designation under the AEDPA. The section will then examine the
court’s analysis as to the “what” of due process, or the content of
due process, and will argue that the court in National Council was
correct in directing the Secretary to provide notice of a designation’s
basis and an opportunity for a putative terrorist organization to
introduce rebuttal evidence into the administrative record.
A. The “When” of Due Process: The National Council Court
Erred in Requiring Pre-Deprivation Process
1. The private interest
The first factor outlined in the Mathews balancing test requires
consideration of “the private interest that will be affected by the
official action.”148 The private interest in National Council was an
interest in a $200 bank account.149 The Secretary argued that such an
interest did not compare to the significant property interests found
by the Supreme Court in prior cases in order to require notice and

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
149. See Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 204; Brief for Respondents at 39, Nat’l Council
(Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439).
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some type of hearing preceding deprivation.150 For example, the
Court in James Daniel required pre-deprivation notice and a hearing
prior to civil forfeiture of a home.151 The government essentially
argued that the private interest in National Council did not carry
much weight in the Mathews balancing test, especially when
considering the other types of interests the Supreme Court has
recognized as significant.
The court in National Council apparently misunderstood the
government’s reasoning, finding that “the decision would seem to
weigh in favor of affording due process protection to the interest
asserted by petitioners—it being a property interest as was the
interest before the Supreme Court in James Daniel Good Real
Property.”152 However, the issue being addressed in the
government’s discussion of the James Daniel case was not whether
the organizations were entitled to due process protection, but
“when” that protection should be provided.153 It was the
government’s opinion that cases like James Daniel demonstrated that
minimal weight should be given to the NCRI’s interest in its bank
account, thus rendering the constitutionality of post-designation
process more likely.
A review of James Daniel demonstrates that the Supreme Court
did give special significance to the private interest in real property
generally, and in a personal residence specifically. In James Daniel,
the United States filed an in rem action “seeking to forfeit Good’s
house and the 4-acre parcel on which it was situated.”154 The
government “sought forfeiture under 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(7), on
the ground that the property had been used to commit or facilitate
the commission of a federal drug offense.”155 In an ex parte hearing,
a United States Magistrate Judge authorized seizure of Good’s
property after finding that “the Government had established
probable cause to believe Good’s property was subject to

150. See Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 206.
151. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 47 (1993)
(emphasis added).
152. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 206.
153. See Brief for Respondents at 46–47, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439).
154. James Daniel, 510 U.S. at 497.
155. Id. Four and a half years previously, Hawaii police found drugs and drug
paraphernalia in Good’s home when executing a search warrant. Good pled guilty to
“promoting a harmful drug in the second degree, in violation of Hawaii law.” Id.
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forfeiture.”156 A few days later, the government seized the property
without a prior hearing or notice to Good.157 Good challenged the
seizure on due process grounds.158
After discussing the above facts, the Supreme Court restated “the
general rule that individuals must receive notice and an opportunity
to be heard before the Government deprives them of property.”159
The government argued that “seizure of real property under the
drug forfeiture laws justifies an exception to the usual due process
requirement of preseizure notice and hearing.”160 The Court rejected
this argument and held that “[u]nless exigent circumstances are
present, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to afford
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing real
property subject to civil forfeiture.”161 In explaining its holding, the
Court noted that the “constitutional limitations we enforce in this
case apply to real property in general.”162 The private interest in real
property, particularly a residence, “is a private interest of historic and
continuing importance.”163 A government seizure of real property
deprives the owner “of valuable rights of ownership, including the
right to sale, the right of occupancy, the right to unrestricted use and
enjoyment, and the right to receive rents.”164 When dealing with the
seizure of real property, the private interests at stake “weigh heavily
in the Mathews balance.”165
While the NCRI’s interest in its $200 bank account should be
accorded some weight, it is not one of those interests, like the
interest in real property discussed above, that “weigh[s] heavily in
the Mathews balance.”166 Of course, it will not always be the case that
the amount of money blocked under the designation provisions of
the AEDPA will be so minimal. In all probability, the weight a court
will give to an organization’s private interest in money will increase

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
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as the amount of money in controversy increases. However, when
compared to the compelling interest of the government in
preventing a putative terrorist organization from transferring its
assets to another jurisdiction before a designation takes effect, an
organization’s interest in a financial account does not seem so
significant.
2. The risk of erroneous deprivation
The second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation, basically
entails an evaluation of the potential value of a hearing in decreasing
the risk of error.167 The Secretary argued that “the risk of erroneous
deprivation here is minimized by the statutory standards and
procedures specified by the Antiterrorism Act.”168 First, the Secretary
must “compile an administrative record on which a designation
decision must be based.”169 Second, the Secretary must “consult with
the Attorney General and the Secretary of Treasury before
designating a foreign terrorist organization.”170 Third, the Secretary
must also “notify congressional leaders seven days before designating
such an organization.”171 The congressional notification must be in
writing and must include information “of the intent to designate a
foreign organization under [the statute], together with the
[required] findings . . . with respect to that organization, and the
factual basis therefor.”172 In addition, although not noted by the
government or the court, any designation under the statute “shall
cease to have effect upon an Act of Congress disapproving such
designation,”173 or upon revocation by the Secretary of State due to
changed circumstances.174 The court summarily rejected the
Secretary’s arguments because neither the involvement of various
officials in the executive branch, nor notice to legislative leaders in
the legislative branch can substitute for a pre-deprivation hearing.175
167. See id.
168. Brief for Respondents at 47, Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State,
251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439).
169. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1) (West 2001).
170. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d 192, 206; see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(c)(4).
171. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 206–07; see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(A).
172. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i).
173. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(B)(ii).
174. See id. § 1189(a)(6).
175. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 207.
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While the court was correct that mere consultation with various
legislative and executive officials cannot replace a pre-deprivation
hearing, such consultation arguably reduces, at least modestly, the
risk of an erroneous decision. In addition, the straightforward nature
of the three factual findings that the Secretary must make under the
Act also reduces the risk of error. The first finding is relatively
simple, thus making the risk of error relatively small—the
organization must be foreign. The second finding involves the
question of whether the organization engages in terrorist activities. It
is often very clear whether or not an organization engages in
terrorism due to the tendency of such organizations to claim
responsibility for terrorist activities committed by them. However,
there may be cases where the issue is not so clear. In those cases, the
risk that terrorism poses to the national security of the United States
and to the physical safety of Americans weighs in favor of deferring
to an initial judgment by the executive branch and allowing the
putative terrorist organization to contest the designation after its
financial support is extinguished. The third and final finding involves
a judgment that is entrusted solely to the executive branch and is not
subject to judicial review—determining whether the terrorist
organization threatens the national security interests of the United
States. Since this finding requires consideration of the government’s
interests, and no one is in a better position to judge the
government’s interests than the government itself, the risk of error in
assessing this factor appears small.
It is also true, however, that if an organization is allowed to
present evidence rebutting the contention that it engages in terrorist
activities prior to a designation, the judgment as to whether the
organization’s activities threaten U.S. interests may be different.
Indeed, the National Council court correctly concluded that these
procedures could not achieve the potential risk reduction that may
be realized by a pre-designation hearing.176 A pre-designation
hearing would in theory reduce the risk of error due to the ability of
an organization considered for imminent designation to introduce
rebuttal evidence to the Secretary before a designation takes effect.
On the other hand, it does not seem likely in practice that any
information introduced by an organization to the Secretary would be
sufficient to change the Secretary’s mind or affect the adequacy of
176. Id.
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the record. However, the theoretical possibility of a reduction in the
risk of erroneous deprivation that may be realized with the provision
of a hearing prior to designation under the AEDPA cannot be
dismissed on mere assumptions as to how a hearing will actually
affect the decision-making process.177 It is sufficient for the purposes
of this Note to presume that a pre-designation hearing will reduce
the risk of erroneous deprivations at least somewhat. Even in making
this assumption, however, the potential benefits realized from a predeprivation hearing are decidedly outweighed by the government’s
interest in taking immediate action to protect itself and its people
from the activities of terrorist organizations. It seems reasonable to
defer to the executive branch the initial determination as to whether
an organization should be designated, especially when that
organization has the ability to contest the executive’s determination
following its imposition.
3. The government’s interest
The third factor in the Mathews balancing test entails an
examination of “the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”178 The Secretary
argued that the government’s interest in prohibiting terrorism was
compelling.179 This compelling interest would be frustrated, the
government alleged, “[i]f an organization were warned that it was
being considered for designation as an alias of a foreign terrorist
organization, [because] it would have an opportunity to remove or
hide its assets.”180 In similar situations, “the Supreme Court has
recognized, on many occasions, that where [the Government] must
act quickly, or where it would be impractical to provide predeprivation process, post-deprivation process satisfies the
requirements of Due Process Clause.”181
Despite this argument, the court concluded that “the
government has offered nothing that apparently weighs in favor of a
post-deprivational as opposed to pre-deprivational compliance with

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 209.
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 207 (internal quotations omitted).
See Brief for Respondents at 48, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439).
Id. at 46 (quoting Gilbert v. Homar, 117 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (1997)).
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due process requirements of the Constitution.”182 The court also
noted that the Secretary has not “shown how affording the
organizations whatever due process they are due before their
designation as foreign terrorist organizations and the resulting
deprivation of right would interfere with the Secretary’s duty to carry
out foreign policy.”183 As such, the court held that “the Secretary
must afford the limited due process available to the putative foreign
terrorist organization prior to the deprivation worked by designating
that entity as such with its attendant consequences.”184
In all fairness to the court, the government’s brief “made little
effort to tie the factors to the question of ‘when’ as opposed to
‘what’ due process is to be afforded.”185 However, the government
did argue that pre-designation process would frustrate the purposes
of the designation, and that argument was found with relative ease in
its discussion of the due process question.186 It is difficult to
understand why the court did not address this argument in its
opinion. It was apparent that the NCRI maintained an interest in a
United States bank account. The NCRI was challenging its first
designation under the AEDPA, and thus the bank account was not
frozen prior to the designation, as would be the case in the
redesignation of an organization with financial assets in the United
States. If the NCRI had received notice of the impending
designation, it would have had the opportunity to transfer what little
assets it did have to a jurisdiction outside of the United States.
Despite these considerations, the court found that “[i]t is not
immediately apparent how the foreign policy goals of the
government in general and the Secretary in particular would be
inherently impaired by [prior] notice.”187
The court was quick to point out that its holding did “not
foreclose the possibility of the Secretary [demonstrating], in an
appropriate case, . . . the necessity of withholding all notice and all
opportunity to present evidence until the designation is already

182.
183.
184.
185.
1439).
186.
187.
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made.”188 It also suggested that upon a showing of “particularized
need,” the Secretary may be able to provide putative terrorist
organizations with notice and some type of hearing following a
designation.189 But if the interest of the government in prohibiting
terrorism, combined with the ease in which a putative terrorist
organization like the NCRI can transfer funds outside the
jurisdiction of the United States, does not justify postponing notice
until after designation, it is difficult to imagine what additional
showing the government must make in order to so qualify under the
court’s standard.
The court also failed to address Supreme Court case law allowing
post-deprivation process when the government interest meets certain
criteria. 190 Even in James Daniel, where the Court held that predeprivation notice and hearing must be afforded before the seizure
of real property, the Court recognized that the government may be
justified in postponing notice and hearing when seizing property
“that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or
concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given.”191 The
issue of post-deprivation process was directly addressed by the Court
in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.192 The plaintiff in that
case leased his yacht to two Puerto Rican residents.193 A little over a
year later, Puerto Rican authorities found marihuana on board the
yacht and seized the yacht pursuant to a statute which provided that
“vessels used to transport, or to facilitate the transportation of,
controlled substances, including marihuana, are subject to seizure
and forfeiture to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.”194 The yacht
“was seized without prior notice to [the lessor] or either lessee and
without prior adversary hearing.”195 Notice was given to the lessees
of the seizure, but when the seizure was not challenged within
188. Id. at 209.
189. Id. at 208–09.
190. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); N.
Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277
U.S. 29 (1928); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Phillips v.
Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921).
191. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 52 (1993) (quoting
Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679).
192. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 663.
193. See id. at 665.
194. Id. at 665–67.
195. Id. at 667.
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fifteen days of the notice, the yacht was forfeited to the Puerto Rican
government.196 The lessor learned of the seizure and forfeiture of the
yacht some days later while “attempting to repossess the yacht from
the lessees, because of their apparent failure to pay rent.”197 The
lessor filed suit, seeking a declaration that the seizure and forfeiture
laws violated due process.198
The Supreme Court denied the lessor’s due process claim
because “seizure for purposes of forfeiture is one of those
extraordinary situations that justif[ies] postponing notice and
opportunity for a hearing.”199 The Court recognized that “in limited
circumstances, immediate seizure of a property interest, without an
opportunity for prior hearing, is constitutionally permissible.”200
Such circumstances occur when three factors are present: (1) “the
seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important
governmental or general public interest”; (2) “there has been a
special need for very prompt action”; and (3) “the State has kept
strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person
initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for
determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it
was necessary and justified in the particular instance.” 201
The Court determined that the “considerations that justif[y]
postponement of notice and hearing . . . are present here.”202 First,
the seizure of the yacht serves an important government purpose
because it “permits Puerto Rico to assert in rem jurisdiction over the
property in order to conduct forfeiture proceedings, thereby
fostering the public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the
property and in enforcing criminal sanctions.”203 In addition,
“preseizure notice and hearing might frustrate the interests served by
the statutes, since the property seized—as here, a yacht—will often
be of a sort that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed,
or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given.”204

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
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Finally, “seizure is not initiated by self-interested private parties;
rather, Commonwealth officials determine whether seizure is
appropriate under the provisions of the Puerto Rican statutes.”205
Under these circumstances, the Court held that “this case presents
an ‘extraordinary’ situation in which postponement of notice and
hearing until after seizure did not deny due process.”206
Application of the Calero-Toledo factors to the AEDPA and the
facts of National Council demonstrates that due process does not
require pre-designation process to be given to putative terrorist
organizations that may have financial assets within the jurisdiction of
the United States. First, designation under the Act and its resulting
consequences serve important governmental interests. Congress has
recognized that “terrorism is a serious and deadly problem that
threatens the vital interests of the United States,”207 that recent
events have demonstrated the threat that terrorism poses to the
physical well-being of United States residents and to domestic and
international commerce,208 and that some organizations finance these
terrorist activities by “rais[ing] significant funds within the United
States, or us[ing] the United States as a conduit for the receipt of
funds raised in other nations.”209 The United States’ attempt to
designate foreign organizations that participate in terrorism in order
to starve them of the financial capital needed to conduct terrorist
activities can be fairly described as compelling. Even the National
Council court itself recognized that “no governmental interest is
more compelling than the security of the nation.”210
The interest in prohibiting terrorism and the financial
consequences resulting from designation under the Act represent a
rare circumstance where there is “a special need for very prompt
action.”211 Even more than the yacht in Calero-Toledo, money found
in a bank account is easily “removed to another jurisdiction,

205. Id.
206. Id. at 679–80.
207. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 301(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
208. See id. § 301(a)(4).
209. Id. § 301(a)(6).
210. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 207 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)).
211. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91
(1972)).
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destroyed, or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were
given.”212 Affording an organization notice and a hearing prior to
designation would frustrate the intent underlying the designation
provisions of the AEDPA, which intent was to curb terrorist activity
and terrorist funding, because a putative foreign terrorist
organization once notified would presumably hide or transfer its
assets.
While it may seem that the special need for prompt action is not
justified when dealing with a paltry sum of money like the $200 in
the National Council case, Congress has indicated that “foreign
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization
facilitates that conduct.”213 In addition, there was the possibility that
the NCRI had bank accounts within the United States of which the
Secretary was not aware. This possibility justified prompt action in
designating the NCRI first, putting American financial institutions
on notice of the designation, and then determining what assets of
the NCRI, if any, were subject to blockage under the Act. The
AEDPA contemplates such a procedure by requiring “any financial
institution that becomes aware that it has possession of, or control
over, any funds in which a terrorist organization, or its agent, has an
interest, . . . [to] report to the Secretary the existence of such
funds . . . .”214
The third and final factor discussed in the Calero-Toledo case was
whether the person initiating the deprivation was “a government
official responsible for determining, under the standards of a
narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the
particular instance.” 215 It is clear that designation under the AEDPA
satisfies this factor. The Secretary of State, a government official, in
consultation with the Secretary of Treasury and the Attorney
General, and after notifying several congressional leaders, determines
whether designation is appropriate under the AEDPA.216 The Act
requires the Secretary to make three required findings before

212. Id. at 679.
213. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (emphasis added).
214. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(2)(B) (West 2001).
215. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678 (quoting Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91).
216. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189 (West 2001).
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designating an organization as a foreign terrorist organization.217
The Act also requires the Secretary to conclude whether the putative
terrorist organization threatens the national security of the United
States, thus necessitating blockage of the organization’s financial
assets in order to protect the United States and its people.
In sum, the three essential considerations that informed the
Calero-Toledo Court’s ruling to allow post-deprivation process are
present here. First, immediate blocking of terrorist funds is necessary
in order to establish the United States’ jurisdiction over the
property.218 Second, the money may disappear if the government
gives advance warning of its intent to block the funds.219 Third, the
designation is made by the Secretary of State under the provisions of
the AEDPA. Consideration of these factors indicates that the
National Council court did not give proper weight to the
government’s interest, and when balanced against the NCRI’s
interest in a bank account and the risk of error, the government’s
interest is sufficiently compelling so as to justify post-designation
process in this case.220 The designation of foreign terrorist

217. See supra Section II.B.
218. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 57 (1993) (citing
Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679).
219. See id.
220. While it seems clear that post-designation process is sufficient under the facts of
National Council, there may be situations in which pre-designation process is required. For
example, if an entity is being redesignated under the Act, then presumably all of its assets are
already frozen, and it does not have the ability to hide or transfer its assets once notified by the
Secretary of its imminent redesignation. Indeed, the National Council court recognized that
“[i]t is particularly difficult to discern how . . . [prior] notice could interfere with the
Secretary’s legitimate goals were it presented to an entity such as the PMOI concerning its
redesignation.” Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208 (D.C.
Cir. 2001). In this type of situation, the compelling governmental interest in delaying notice
and a hearing until after designation is simply not present, and pre-designation process will
normally be required, unless the organization has no constitutional presence in the United
States.
It is not always the case, however, that redesignation will require the Secretary to afford
putative terrorist organizations with pre-designation process. The facts of National Council
demonstrate this well. At the outset, it is important to recognize that if the NCRI was not
designated as an alias of the PMOI, the PMOI would not have been able to establish a
constitutional presence in the United States. Without this presence, the PMOI could not even
assert a due process claim, let alone claim entitlement to pre-designation process. While it is true
that providing such an entity with pre-deprivation process would not interfere with the Secretary’s
foreign policy goals, the Secretary is simply not constitutionally required to provide such an entity
with due process. The PMOI was saved from this fate by the designation of the NCRI as its alias
and the NCRI’s possession of a bank account. But since the NCRI’s possession of a bank
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organizations with financial assets in the United States “present[s] an
extraordinary situation in which postponement of notice and hearing
until after seizure d[oes] not deny due process.”221
B. The “What” of Due Process: The National Council Court
Did Not Err in Requiring Additional Procedural Protection
In addition to the question of whether post-designation process
satisfies the Constitution, there remains the issue of whether the
procedural protections outlined in the AEDPA, given before or after
a designation, actually satisfy due process. This issue concerns the
“what” of due process. While consideration of the Mathews factors
indicates that process may be constitutionally provided after a
designation is made, consideration of these same factors
demonstrates that the procedural protections of the Act do not meet
the requirements of the Due Process Clause. The National Council
court was correct in requiring the Secretary to give notice to putative
terrorist organizations of the basis of designations and in requiring
the Secretary to allow such organizations the opportunity to
introduce rebuttal evidence into the record.222
account implicates the government’s interest in preventing the transfer of assets prior to
designation, and since the NCRI and the PMOI are one, the Due Process Clause was not
violated by postponing process for both organizations until after the designation.
221. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679–80. President Bush recently confirmed this
conclusion in Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001):
For those persons listed in the Annex to this order or determined to be subject to
this order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, I find that
because of the ability to transfer funds or assets instantaneously, prior notice to such
persons of measures to be taken pursuant to this order would render these measures
ineffectual. I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in
addressing the national emergency declared in this order, there need be no prior
notice of a listing or determination made pursuant to this order.
222. Instead of finding the underlying statute unconstitutional, the National Council
court simply required the Secretary of State to provide putative terrorist organizations with
certain constitutionally required procedures. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 209. Calling this
portion of the National Council decision “impermissible judicial legislation,” a federal district
court recently refused to construe any procedures into § 1189. United States v. Rahmani, 209
F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1057 (C.D. Cal 2002). As a result, the court held the statute to be facially
unconstitutional for failing to provide putative terrorist organizations with notice and an
opportunity to introduce rebuttal evidence into the record. Id. at 1058. Although it is
tempting to address the decision’s criticism of National Council, such a discussion is beyond
the scope of this Note. The decision’s value as precedent is also negligible, since challenges to
designations under the AEDPA must be brought in the D.C. Circuit. See 8 U.S.C.A. §
1189(b)(1); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000). But see
Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
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1. Terrorist organizations must be allowed to introduce rebuttal
evidence into the record
Organizations may challenge designations made under the
AEDPA in the D.C. Circuit within thirty days after publication of
the designations in the Federal Register.223 The court’s review of a
designation must be “based solely upon the administrative
record.”224 The Secretary may also present classified information
relied upon in making a designation for ex parte and in camera
review.225 The court in National Council held that this postdesignation hearing alone did not satisfy the due process hearing
requirement, but that the Secretary must also afford putative terrorist
organizations with “the opportunity to present, at least in written
form, such evidence as . . . [they] may be able to produce to rebut
the administrative record or otherwise negate the proposition that
they are foreign terrorist organizations.”226 Application of the
Mathews factors to the AEDPA and the facts presented in National
Council demonstrates that the court’s holding in this respect was
correct.
The constitutionally cognizable private interest that will probably
most often be implicated by designation under the AEDPA is an
organization’s interest in some financial asset possessed or controlled
by a United States financial institution.227 The NCRI in National
Council asserted an interest in a United States bank account.228 The
court found that this interest was sufficient to entitle the NCRI to
due process protection.229 One of “the fundamental requirement[s]
of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.”230 This hearing requirement normally
must include the opportunity for an opposing party to introduce

223. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(b)(1) (West 2001).
224. Id. § 1189(b)(2).
225. Id.
226. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 209. The court stated that “even in those instances when
post-deprivation process is sufficient, our review under § 1189(b) is not sufficient to supply the
otherwise absent due process protection.” Id.
227. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C).
228. Id. at 201; see also Brief for Respondents at 39, Nat’l Council (Nos. 99-1438, 991439).
229. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 203.
230. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
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rebuttal evidence into the record.231 An organization does not have
this opportunity under the statutory provisions of the AEDPA. In
order to dispense with this requirement, if it is possible at all, the risk
of erroneous deprivation must be low and the government interest
must be high. Such a situation does not exist here. The importance
of the government’s interest may justify delaying a hearing until after
a designation, but it certainly does not justify eliminating a
meaningful hearing entirely.
The prevailing assumption is that providing an opposing party
with an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence into the record will
reduce the risk of an erroneous decision.232 In considering the nature
of the record upon which the Secretary bases her determination, this
assumption seems well placed when dealing with designations under
the AEDPA. The D.C. Circuit noted in reviewing past designations
that the administrative “record consists entirely of hearsay, none of
it . . . ever subjected to adversary testing, and . . . no opportunity for
counter-evidence by the organizations affected.”233 Without counterevidence in the record, the court is unable to test the reliability or
accuracy of the information upon which the Secretary relied in
making a designation. “As we see it,” the court observed, “our only
function is to decide if the Secretary, on the face of things, had
enough information before her to come to the conclusion that the
organizations were foreign and engaged in terrorism.”234 That
determination “might be mistaken, but that depends on the quality
of the information in the reports she received—something we have
no way of judging.”235 In light of the compelling nature of the
government’s interest in protecting this nation from terrorism, it
seems reasonable to delay the opportunity to introduce rebuttal
evidence until after a designation is made. However, once a
particular designation is made and the financial assets of the targeted
organization are frozen, the objections to allowing the organization
to introduce rebuttal evidence into the record are eliminated, and
the risk of error present in a decision based on a record compiled
231. See, e.g., Wolf v. McDonnel, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974) (“Ordinarily, the right to
present evidence is basic to a fair hearing.”).
232. See, e.g., Lister v. Hoover, 706 F.2d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 1983).
233. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 25 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
234. Id.
235. Id.

712

ELL-FIN

675]

9/30/2002 9:20 AM

Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

solely by the Secretary weighs in favor of providing this procedural
protection.
2. Terrorist organizations must be given notice of the basis of
designation
The Secretary must notify Congress one week prior to making a
designation.236 Once Congress is notified of an impending
designation, all financial assets of the putative foreign terrorist
organization found within the possession or control of United States
financial institutions may be blocked. 237 Seven days after notifying
Congress, the Secretary must publish the designation in the Federal
Register.238 The court in National Council found the notice
provided to putative terrorist organizations generally, and the NCRI
and the PMOI specifically, constitutionally insufficient.239 In order to
meet the demands of due process, the court held that the Secretary
must provide a putative terrorist organization with notice of the
designation, the administrative record, and the unclassified items
upon which she relied or proposes to rely in making the
designation.240 Application of the Mathews factors to the AEDPA and
the facts in National Council will demonstrate that the court’s
conclusion as to notice was correct.
As mentioned above, a putative terrorist organization’s claim to
constitutional protection will probably most often arise from the
deprivation of a financial asset controlled or possessed by a United
States financial institution.241 The NCRI had an interest in a $200
bank account.242 There is little question that this interest entitles the
NCRI and other similarly situated organizations to the protection of
the Due Process Clause.243 One of the fundamental protections
provided by due process is notice of the action sought and its

236. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i) (West 2001).
237. See id. § 1189(a)(2)(C); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(2) (West 2001).
238. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(ii).
239. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 209 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
240. Id. at 209.
241. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(C).
242. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 201; see also Brief for Respondents at 39, Nat’l Council
(Nos. 99-1438, 99-1439).
243. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 203.
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basis.244 While the AEDPA does give a putative terrorist organization
notice of a designation by publication in the Federal Register, it does
not give an organization notice of the designation’s basis. Without
this notice, it is extremely difficult for an organization to utilize the
availability of a hearing because of its inability to determine the
underlying factors upon which the Secretary relied in making a
designation. Imposing such a difficulty on a putative terrorist
organization can be justified, if at all, by circumstances indicating
that the risk of erroneous deprivation is minimal and the government
interest is compelling. Designation under the AEDPA does not
present such a situation.
When the Secretary publishes notice of designations in the
Federal Register, she merely lists the name of each foreign terrorist
organization and the names of its aliases. Nowhere does the
document state the factual basis for designating each organization.
In all probability, an organization will not learn of the information
upon which the Secretary relied in making the designation unless
and until it challenges the Secretary’s decision in the D.C. Circuit. At
that time, the Secretary will be forced to publicly file the unclassified
version of the administrative record in order to support her
decision.245 However, receiving notice so late in the game necessarily
prevents the organization from presenting rebuttal evidence in the
administrative record in an attempt to change the Secretary’s mind.
This in turn will likely increase the risk of a mistaken deprivation,
especially considering that the record upon which judicial review is
based may be composed entirely of hearsay evidence.246 While the
importance of the government’s interest in protecting the American
people from terrorism weighs in favor of delaying notice until after a
designation is made, it cannot support the total denial of proper
notice to a putative terrorist organization when the reasons for
delaying notice no longer exist.
It is clear that pre-designation notice would allow a putative
terrorist organization to hide or transfer its assets outside of the
jurisdiction of the United States. This would undermine the
244. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 39 (1982) (“To satisfy due process,
notice must clarify what the charges are in a manner adequate to apprise the individual of the
basis for the government’s proposed action.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
245. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 209.
246. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 25 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
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government’s ability to stifle funding to terrorist organizations.
However, it is not clear how this same interest applies to “what” type
of notice a terrorist organization should be given. In other words,
the question of “when” notice should be given bears little
relationship in this case to what the content of that notice should be
when actually given. The government may have an interest in
withholding some information upon which the Secretary relied in
making a designation when that information is confidential. Indeed,
the National Council court itself recognized this governmental
interest by allowing the government to withhold the presentation of
such information to the organization in question.247 The government
may instead present this confidential information in camera and ex
parte to the court in accordance with the provisions of the
AEDPA.248 However, this fails to justify the government in not
informing putative terrorist organizations of the non-classified
information upon which the Secretary relied in making designations,
especially when considering the risk of erroneous deprivation and the
important private interest involved.
VI. CONCLUSION
President Bush has indicated that “a major thrust of our war on
terrorism . . . [is to] launch[] a strike on the financial foundation of
the global terror network.”249 The designation provisions of the
AEDPA are a major weapon in the war that can and should be used
to accomplish the objective of curbing the ability of terrorist
organizations to fund terrorist activity. Under the Act, the Secretary
of State can block all financial transactions involving the assets of a
foreign terrorist organization. In addition, the Secretary can prohibit
anyone from providing material support to a foreign terrorist
organization. Prior notice of an impending designation would render
the consequences of the designation ineffective due to the ability of
an organization to quickly transfer its assets to another jurisdiction.
A careful balancing of the private interest, the risk of error, and the
government interest found in the National Council case indicates

247. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 208–09.
248. Id.
249. Remarks on the United States Financial Sanctions Against Foreign Terrorists and
Their Supporters and an Exchange with Reporters, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1364,
1364 (Sept. 28, 2001).
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that the court erroneously required pre-designation process.
Designation of a foreign terrorist organization with financial assets in
the United States is one of those “extraordinary situation[s] in which
postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure d[oes] not
deny due process.”250
If the decision in National Council is upheld, the purpose of the
designation procedure under the AEDPA will be completely
undermined, and the statute will no longer be effective in blocking
the assets of foreign terrorist organizations within the United States.
This result would be unfortunate given the increasing threat of
terrorism to the United States and its people. As President Bush
indicated following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the United
States intends to “direct every resource at . . . [its] command, every
means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of
law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary
weapon of war, to the disruption and to the defeat of the global
terror network.”251 The designation provisions of the AEDPA are
one such resource that can and should be used to curb the threat of
terrorism. The D.C. Circuit should reevaluate its decision in
National Council and hold that post-designation process does not
violate the Due Process Clause when designating a putative terrorist
organization with financial assets in the United States.
Joshua A. Ellis

250. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679–80 (1974).
251. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347, 1349 (Sept. 20,
2001).
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